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William Lane Craig (/ k r eɪ ɡ /; [2] born August 23, 1949) is an American analytic philosopher, Christian apologist, author, and Wesleyan theologian who upholds the view of Molinism and neo-Apollinarianism. [3] [4] [5] He is a professor of philosophy at Houston Christian University and at the Talbot School of Theology of Biola University. [6]
William Lane Craig (born 1949), who revived the Kalam cosmological argument during the 20th and 21st centuries. The Kalam cosmological argument is a modern formulation of the cosmological argument for the existence of God.
Absolute (Thomistic) divine simplicity has been criticized by a number of Christian theologians, including John S. Feinberg, Thomas Morris, William Lane Craig, and Alvin Plantinga; in his essay "Does God Have a Nature?", Plantinga calls it "a dark saying indeed". [27] Plantinga presents three arguments against Thomistic divine simplicity.
William Lane Craig uses Molinism to reconcile scriptural passages warning of apostasy with passages teaching the security of believers. [18] Craig has also used middle knowledge to explain a wide range of theological issues, such as divine providence [ 19 ] and predestination , [ 20 ] biblical inspiration , [ 21 ] perseverance of the saints ...
Social trinitarianism is a diverse movement, which makes it difficult to define. But in its fully developed form, its starting point (or at least emphasis) is not simplicity—some reject simplicity—but the three persons. The Trinity is not defined primarily by eternal relations of origin.
William Lane Craig asserts that—even if one posits a plurality of causes for the existence of the universe—a first uncaused cause is necessary, otherwise an infinite regress of causes would arise, which he argues is impossible.
But other Christian philosophers argue that Platonism is incompatible with divine aseity. William Lane Craig urges Christian philosophers to consider anti-realist theories of abstract objects. [ 9 ]
William Lane Craig clarifies that properly basic beliefs can be "memory beliefs" (e.g., “I left the car keys in the dresser”) and "perceptual beliefs" (e.g., “I see a cat in the backyard”), but they can be defeasible, "that is to say, they can be mistaken".