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The follower actually observes this and in equilibrium picks the expected quantity as a response. To calculate the SPNE, the best response functions of the follower must first be calculated (calculation moves 'backwards' because of backward induction). The profit of firm (the follower) is revenue minus cost.
The first of these corresponds to the quantity sold when the price is zero (which is the maximum quantity the public is willing to consume), while the second states that the derivative of () with respect to is 0, but () is the monetary value of an aggregate sales quantity , and the turning point of this value is a maximum. Evidently, the sales ...
The concept of a mixed-strategy equilibrium was introduced by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in their 1944 book The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, but their analysis was restricted to the special case of zero-sum games. They showed that a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium will exist for any zero-sum game with a finite set of ...
At k-level 2, a player would play more sophisticatedly and assume that all other players are playing at k-level 1, so they would choose 22 (2/3 of 33). [9] Players are presumptively aware of the probability distributions of selections at each higher level. It would take approximately 21 k-levels to reach 0, the Nash equilibrium of the game.
In most simple microeconomic stories of supply and demand a static equilibrium is observed in a market; however, economic equilibrium can be also dynamic. Equilibrium may also be economy-wide or general, as opposed to the partial equilibrium of a single market. Equilibrium can change if there is a change in demand or supply conditions.
A coordination game is a type of simultaneous game found in game theory. It describes the situation where a player will earn a higher payoff when they select the same course of action as another player. The game is not one of pure conflict, which results in multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria in which players choose matching strategies ...
Therefore, the sole equilibrium in the Bertrand model emerges when both firms establish a price equal to unit cost, known as the competitive price. [9] It is to highlight that the Bertrand equilibrium is a weak Nash-equilibrium. The firms lose nothing by deviating from the competitive price: it is an equilibrium simply because each firm can ...
A formula game is an artificial game represented by a fully quantified Boolean formula such as …. One player (E) has the goal of choosing values so as to make the formula ψ {\displaystyle \psi } true, and selects values for the variables that are existentially quantified with ∃ {\displaystyle \exists } .