Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
Kenneth Arrow's monograph Social Choice and Individual Values (1951, 2nd ed., 1963, 3rd ed., 2012) and a theorem within it created modern social choice theory, a rigorous melding of social ethics and voting theory with an economic flavor.
Social choice theory is the study of theoretical and practical methods to aggregate or combine individual preferences into a collective social welfare function. The field generally assumes that individuals have preferences , and it follows that they can be modeled using utility functions , by the VNM theorem .
Arrow's monograph Social Choice and Individual Values derives from his 1951 PhD thesis. If we exclude the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility, then the only methods of passing from individual tastes to social preferences which will be satisfactory and which will be defined for a wide range of sets of individual orderings are ...
Arrow's framework assumed individual and social preferences are orderings or rankings, i.e. statements about which outcomes are better or worse than others. [43] Taking inspiration from the strict behaviorism popular in psychology, some philosophers and economists rejected the idea of comparing internal human experiences of well-being .
In social choice theory, Condorcet's voting paradox is a fundamental discovery by the Marquis de Condorcet that majority rule is inherently self-contradictory.The result implies that it is logically impossible for any voting system to guarantee that a winner will have support from a majority of voters: for example there can be rock-paper-scissors scenario where a majority of voters will prefer ...
Kenneth J. Arrow, 1951, 2nd ed., 1963, Social Choice and Individual Values ISBN 0-300-01364-7; Abram Bergson (Burk),"A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 52(2), February 1938, 310–34; Bergson–Samuelson social welfare functions in Paretian welfare economics from the New School.
Minimal liberalism (individual freedom): More than one individual in the society is decisive on a pair of social outcomes. (An individual is decisive on a pair of social outcomes x and y if, whenever they prefer x over y, the social choice function prefers x over y regardless of what other members of
Social Choice and Individual Values; Social welfare function; Symmetry (social choice) U. Unrestricted domain This page was last edited on 25 December 2023, at 21 ...