Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
In game theory and economics, a mechanism is called incentive-compatible (IC) [1]: 415 if every participant can achieve their own best outcome by reporting their true preferences. [ 1 ] : 225 [ 2 ] For example, there is incentive compatibility if high-risk clients are better off in identifying themselves as high-risk to insurance firms , who ...
Risk dominance and payoff dominance are two related refinements of the Nash equilibrium (NE) solution concept in game theory, defined by John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten.A Nash equilibrium is considered payoff dominant if it is Pareto superior to all other Nash equilibria in the game. 1 When faced with a choice among equilibria, all players would agree on the payoff dominant equilibrium since ...
For example, B is "throw rock" while A is "throw scissors" in Rock, Paper, Scissors. This notion can be generalized beyond the comparison of two strategies. Strategy B is strictly dominant if strategy B strictly dominates every other possible strategy. Strategy B is weakly dominant if strategy B weakly dominates every other possible strategy.
A social choice rule is dominant strategy incentive compatible, or strategy-proof, if the associated revelation mechanism has the property that honestly reporting the truth is always a dominant strategy for each agent." [2] However, the payments to agents become large, sacrificing budget neutrality to incentive compatibility.
Another use of game theory in managerial economics is in analyzing pricing strategies. For example, firms may use game theory to determine the optimal pricing strategy based on how they expect their competitors to respond to their pricing decisions. Overall, game theory serves as a useful tool for analyzing strategic interactions and decision ...
Any game that satisfies the following two conditions constitutes a Deadlock game: (1) e>g>a>c and (2) d>h>b>f. These conditions require that d and D be dominant. (d, D) be of mutual benefit, and that one prefer one's opponent play c rather than d. Like the Prisoner's Dilemma, this game has one unique Nash equilibrium: (d, D).
If x is not an SNE, the condition requires that one can move to a different strategy-profile which is a social-welfare-best-response for all coalitions simultaneously. For example, consider a game with two players, with strategy spaces [1/3, 2] and [3/4, 2], which are clearly compact and convex. The utility functions are: u1(x) = - x1 2 + x2 + 1
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (a strategy profile specifies a strategy for every player, e.g. in the above prisoners' dilemma game (cooperate, defect) specifies that prisoner 1 plays cooperate and prisoner 2 plays defect) in which every strategy played by every agent (agent i) is a best response to every other strategy played by all the other opponents (agents j for every j≠i) .