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The Gettier problem, in the field of epistemology, is a landmark philosophical problem concerning the understanding of descriptive knowledge.Attributed to American philosopher Edmund Gettier, Gettier-type counterexamples (called "Gettier-cases") challenge the long-held justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge.
Justification is a property of beliefs insofar as they are held blamelessly. In other words, a justified belief is a belief that a person is entitled to hold. Many philosophers from Plato onward have treated "justified true belief" (JTB) as constituting knowledge.
Edmund Gettier is best known for his 1963 paper entitled "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", which called into question the common conception of knowledge as justified true belief. [47] In just two and a half pages, Gettier argued that there are situations in which one's belief may be justified and true, yet fail to count as knowledge.
According to the so-called traditional analysis, [f] knowledge has three components: it is a belief that is justified and true. [43] In the second half of the 20th century, this view was put into doubt by a series of thought experiments that aimed to show that some justified true beliefs do not amount to knowledge. [44]
Justified true belief is a definition of knowledge that gained approval during the Enlightenment, "justified" standing in contrast to "revealed". There have been attempts to trace it back to Plato and his dialogues, more specifically in the Theaetetus , [ 51 ] and the Meno .
Edmund Lee Gettier III (/ ˈ ɡ ɛ t i ər /; October 31, 1927 – March 23, 2021) was an American philosopher at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.He is best known for his article written in 1963: "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", [1] which has generated an extensive philosophical literature trying to respond to what became known as the Gettier problem.
Suppose that P is some piece of knowledge. Then P is a justified true belief. The only thing that can justify P is another statement – let's call it P 1; so P 1 justifies P. But if P 1 is to be a satisfactory justification for P, then we must know that P 1 is true. But for P 1 to be known, it must also be a justified true belief.
P is true. S believes that P is true. S is justified in their belief that P is true. S's justification guarantees the truth of P. According to the infallibilist, fallible beliefs may be rationally justified, but they do not rise to the level of knowledge unless their truth is absolutely certain