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Hume's fork is the idea that all items of knowledge are based either on logic and definitions, or else on observation. If the is–ought problem holds, then "ought" statements do not seem to be known in either of these two ways, and it would seem that there can be no moral knowledge. Moral skepticism and non-cognitivism work with such conclusions.
The fact–value distinction is closely related to, and derived from, the is–ought problem in moral philosophy, characterized by David Hume. [3] The terms are often used interchangeably, though philosophical discourse concerning the is–ought problem does not usually encompass aesthetics.
The problem in philosophy of moving from an "is" to an "ought" (the "Is-ought problem") is said to have been introduced into philosophy by David Hume. Richmond Campbell, in discussing this, asks how one might move from a knowledge of what exists, i.e. from a whole range of possible values, to a knowledge of which, among these, one ought to ...
The term naturalistic fallacy is sometimes used to label the problematic inference of an ought from an is (the is–ought problem). [3] Michael Ridge relevantly elaborates that "[t]he intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the naturalistic features of things do not entail or even support evaluative conclusions."
They further argue that political fact-checking focuses exclusively on describing facts over making moral judgments (ex., the is–ought problem), assert that it relies on public reason to attempt to discredit public figures, and question its effectiveness on conspiracy theories or fascism. [108]
The problem of the missing shade of blue arises because just two paragraphs later Hume seems to provide just such an idea. He says: He says: There is, however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may prove, that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise, independent of their correspondent impressions.
The problem is similar with respect to the supervenience of normative facts on natural facts. Discussing the is-ought problem it is agreed that facts about how persons ought to act are not entailed by natural facts but cannot vary unless natural facts vary, and this rigid binding without entailment might seem puzzling.
Persuasive definition – purporting to use the "true" or "commonly accepted" meaning of a term while, in reality, using an uncommon or altered definition. (cf. the if-by-whiskey fallacy) Ecological fallacy – inferring about the nature of an entity based solely upon aggregate statistics collected for the group to which that entity belongs.