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The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a [hard] problem of consciousness. In his "second approximation", he says it is the problem of explaining the behavior of "phenomenal reports", and the behavior of expressing a belief that there is a hard problem of consciousness ...
Is there a "hard problem of consciousness"? If so, how is it solved? Vertiginous question: Why is it that a specific subject of experience is "live" from a given perspective? What, if anything, is the function of consciousness? [2] [3] Problem of mental causation: How exactly do mental states cause intentional actions to happen?
The hard problem of consciousness is the question of what consciousness is and why we have consciousness as opposed to being philosophical zombies. The adjective "hard" is to contrast with the "easy" consciousness problems, which seek to explain the mechanisms of consciousness ("why" as compared with "how", or final cause versus efficient cause ...
Neurophenomenology refers to a scientific research program aimed to address the hard problem of consciousness in a pragmatic way. [1] It combines neuroscience with phenomenology in order to study experience, mind, and consciousness with an emphasis on the embodied condition of the human mind. [2]
New mysterianism, or commonly just mysterianism, is a philosophical position proposing that the hard problem of consciousness cannot be resolved by humans. The unresolvable problem is how to explain the existence of qualia (individual instances of subjective, conscious experience).
Apart from the general question of the "hard problem" of consciousness (which is, roughly speaking, the question of how mental experience can arise from a physical basis [65]), a more specialized question is how to square the subjective notion that we are in control of our decisions (at least in some small measure) with the customary view of ...
Hutson admires Dehaene's success with neural correlates of consciousness but feels that the hard problem remains unresolved. Like Kalat, Hutson finds Dehaene's dismissal of the hard problem unjustified because consciousness is "unique" in being "inherently private, subjective", unlike other phenomena that can be reductively explained. [3]
The main philosophical problem faced by "mind uploading" or mind copying is the hard problem of consciousness: the difficulty of explaining how a physical entity such as a human can have qualia, phenomenal consciousness, or subjective experience. [37]