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Example Condorcet method voting ballot. Blank votes are equivalent to ranking that candidate last. A Condorcet method (English: / k ɒ n d ɔːr ˈ s eɪ /; French: [kɔ̃dɔʁsɛ]) is an election method that elects the candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate.
[8] [9] Previous research has found cycles to be somewhat rare in real elections, with estimates of their prevalence ranging from 1-10% of races. [10] Systems that guarantee the election of a Condorcet winners (when one exists) include Ranked Pairs, Schulze's method, and the Tideman alternative method.
They looked at Condorcet cycles in voter preferences (an example of which is A being preferred to B by a majority of voters, B to C and C to A) and found that the number of them was consistent with small-sample effects, concluding that "voting cycles will occur very rarely, if at all, in elections with many voters."
For example, the methods used are the major ones listed on the voting methods page, but any related criteria is used only if the primary criteria is met: a condorcet method may be evaluated against Smith and Schwartz. A majority method may be evaluated for mutual majority criterion.
In voting systems, the Minimax Condorcet method is a single-winner ranked-choice voting method that always elects the majority (Condorcet) winner. [1] Minimax compares all candidates against each other in a round-robin tournament , then ranks candidates by their worst election result (the result where they would receive the fewest votes).
Approval voting is a system in which the voter can approve of (or vote for) any number of candidates on a ballot. Approval voting fails the Condorcet criterion Consider an election in which 70% of the voters prefer candidate A to candidate B to candidate C, while 30% of the voters prefer C to B to A.
A voting method is the procedure at the heart of an election that specifies what information is to be gathered from voters, and how that collected information is to be utilized to determine the ...
Thus, Condorcet proved a weaker form of Arrow's impossibility theorem long before Arrow, under the stronger assumption that a voting system in the two-candidate case will agree with a simple majority vote. [20] Unlike pluralitarian rules such as ranked-choice runoff (RCV) or first-preference plurality, [6] Condorcet methods avoid the spoiler ...