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Because of this example, some authors credit Condorcet with having given an intuitive argument that presents the core of Arrow's theorem. [20] However, Arrow's theorem is substantially more general; it applies to methods of making decisions other than one-man-one-vote elections, such as markets or weighted voting, based on ranked ballots.
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You are free: to share – to copy, distribute and transmit the work; to remix – to adapt the work; Under the following conditions: attribution – You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses ...
English: This diagram accompanies part one of the proof Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. It illustrates the process of successively moving one candidate from the bottom to the top of ballots. It illustrates the process of successively moving one candidate from the bottom to the top of ballots.
The work culminated in what Arrow called the "General Possibility Theorem," better known thereafter as Arrow's (impossibility) theorem. The theorem states that, absent restrictions on either individual preferences or neutrality of the constitution to feasible alternatives, there exists no social choice rule that satisfies a set of plausible ...
Ease of explanation. Some voting rules are difficult to explain to voters in a way they can intuitively understand, which may undermine public trust in elections. [8] [failed verification] For example, while Schulze's rule performs well by many of the criteria above, it requires an involved explanation of beatpaths. Ease of voting.
Arrow's impossibility theorem is a key result on social welfare functions, showing an important difference between social and consumer choice: whereas it is possible to construct a rational (non-self-contradictory) decision procedure for consumers based only on ordinal preferences, it is impossible to do the same in the social choice setting ...
Dictatorships often crop up as degenerate cases or exceptions to theorems, e.g. Arrow's theorem. If there are at least three alternatives, dictatorship is the only ranked voting rule that satisfies unrestricted domain, Pareto efficiency, and independence of irrelevant alternatives.