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Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), was a United States Supreme Court decision that ruled on the issue of whether the government's grant of immunity from prosecution can compel a witness to testify over an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled, by a 6–2 vote, that it is a violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights for the prosecutor to comment to the jury on the defendant's declining to testify, or for the judge to instruct the jury that such silence is evidence of guilt.
In addition, grand jury witnesses may be prosecuted for perjury or making false statements in their testimony. In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the US Supreme Court confronted the issue of the type of immunity, use or transactional, constitutionally required to compel testimony. The Court ruled that the grant of use and ...
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States and written by Justice Antonin Scalia that established the test used to determine whether a hearsay statement is "testimonial" for Confrontation Clause purposes.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), [1] is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that it was a violation of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation for a prosecutor to submit a chemical drug test report without the testimony of the person who performed the test. [2]
Diaz was convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Court rejected petitioner's argument that Agent Flood's testimony violated rule 704(b). The Court ruled that Flood's statements did not constitute an "explicit opinion" on the defendant's state of mind. [4]
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), is a United States Supreme Court case involving the spousal privilege and its application in the law of evidence. In it, the Court held that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying.
In the instant case, the Court held that a trial judge could hold the "presumption" that a new witnesses' testimony is perjured due to "a pattern of discovery violations". [24] The pattern in Taylor's case was a series of two amendments to the witness list done in bad faith. [ 25 ] "