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In the fields of mechanism design and social choice theory, Gibbard's theorem is a result proven by philosopher Allan Gibbard in 1973. [1] It states that for any deterministic process of collective decision, at least one of the following three properties must hold: The process is dictatorial, i.e. there is a single voter whose vote chooses the ...
Gibbard's theorem shows that any strategyproof game form (i.e. one with a dominant strategy) with more than two outcomes is dictatorial. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is a special case showing that no deterministic voting system can be fully invulnerable to strategic voting in all circumstances, regardless of how others vote.
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is a theorem in social choice theory. It was first conjectured by the philosopher Michael Dummett and the mathematician Robin Farquharson in 1961 [ 1 ] and then proved independently by the philosopher Allan Gibbard in 1973 [ 2 ] and economist Mark Satterthwaite in 1975. [ 3 ]
Gershgorin circle theorem (matrix theory) Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (voting methods) Girsanov's theorem (stochastic processes) Glaisher's theorem (number theory) Gleason's theorem (Hilbert space) Glivenko's theorem (mathematical logic) Glivenko's theorem (probability) Glivenko–Cantelli theorem (probability) Goddard–Thorn theorem ...
Gibbard's theorem is itself generalized by Gibbard's 1978 theorem [11] and Hylland's theorem, which extend these results to non-deterministic processes, i.e. where the outcome may not only depend on the agents' actions but may also involve an element of chance. The Gibbard's theorem assumes the collective decision results in exactly one winner ...
The following is a list of notable unsolved problems grouped into broad areas of physics. [1]Some of the major unsolved problems in physics are theoretical, meaning that existing theories seem incapable of explaining a certain observed phenomenon or experimental result.
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