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It is a common property in the plurality-rule family of voting systems. For example, say a group of voters ranks Alice 2nd and Bob 6th, and Alice wins the election. In the next election, Bob focuses on expanding his appeal with this group of voters, but does not manage to defeat Alice—Bob's rating increases from 6th-place to 3rd.
An electoral system (or voting system) is a set of rules that determine how elections and referendums are conducted and how their results are determined.. Some electoral systems elect a single winner (single candidate or option), while others elect multiple winners, such as members of parliament or boards of directors.
Approval voting trivially satisfies the majority criterion: if a majority of voters approve of A, but a majority do not approve of any other candidate, then A will have an average approval above 50%, while all other candidates will have an average approval below 50%, and A will be elected.
Majority winner Majority loser Mutual majority Condorcet winner [Tn 1] Condorcet loser Smith [Tn 1] Smith-IIA [Tn 1] IIA/LIIA [Tn 1] Cloneproof Monotone Participation Later-no-harm [Tn 1]
When mentioned without A voting system is winner-consistent if and only if it is a point-summing method; in other words, it must be a positional voting system or score voting (including approval voting). [3] [2] As shown below for Kemeny-Young and majority judgment, these three variants do not always agree with each other (which contrasts with ...
The majority favorite criterion is a voting system criterion that says that, if a candidate would win more than half the vote in a first-preference plurality election, that candidate should win. Equivalently, if only one candidate is ranked first by a over 50% of voters, that candidate must win.
The Borda count does not comply with the Condorcet criterion in the following case. Consider an election consisting of five voters and three alternatives (candidates A, B, and C), with the following votes: A > B > C: 3; B > C > A: 2; In this election, the Borda count awards 2 points for 1st choice, 1 point for second and 0 points for third.
Let L be a subset of candidates. A solid coalition in support of L is a group of voters who strictly prefer all members of L to all candidates outside of L. In other words, each member of the solid coalition ranks their least-favorite member of L higher than their favorite member outside L. Note that the members of the solid coalition may rank the members of L differently.