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In philosophy, Wittgenstein's ladder is a metaphor set out by Ludwig Wittgenstein about learning. In what may be a deliberate reference to Søren Kierkegaard 's Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments , [ 1 ] [ 2 ] the penultimate proposition of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (translated from the original German) reads:
Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (/ ˈ v ɪ t ɡ ən ʃ t aɪ n,-s t aɪ n / VIT-gən-s(h)tyne, [7] Austrian German: [ˈluːdvɪk ˈjoːsɛf ˈjoːhan ˈvɪtɡn̩ʃtaɪn]; 26 April 1889 – 29 April 1951) was an Austrian philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.
Zettel (German: "slip(s) of paper") is a collection of assorted remarks by Ludwig Wittgenstein, first published in 1967.It contains several discussions of philosophical psychology and of the tendency in philosophy to try for a synoptic view of phenomena. [1]
By objects, Wittgenstein did not mean physical objects in the world, but the absolute base of logical analysis, that can be combined but not divided (TLP 2.02–2.0201). [13] According to Wittgenstein's logico-atomistic metaphysical system, objects each have a "nature", which is their capacity to combine with other objects.
Meaning is a complicated phenomenon that is woven into the fabric of our lives. A good first approximation of Wittgenstein's point is that meaning is a social event; meaning happens between language users. As a consequence, it makes no sense to talk about a private language, with words that mean something in the absence of other users of the ...
You might be surprised by how many popular movie quotes you're remembering just a bit wrong. 'The Wizard of Oz' Though most people say 'Looks like we're not in Kansas anymore,' or 'Toto, I don't think
If we are taught the meaning of the word 'yellow' by being given some sort of ostensive definition [in this case, ostensive means something like "denoting a way of defining by direct demonstration, e.g., by pointing"] (a rule of the usage of the word) this teaching can be looked at in two different ways: (a) The teaching is a drill. This drill ...
As Kenny put it, "Even to think falsely that something is S, I must know the meaning of S; and this is what Wittgenstein argues is impossible in the private language." [14] Because there is no way to check the meaning (or use) of S apart from that private ostensive act of definition, it is not possible to know what S means. The sense has ...