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Modularity of mind is the notion that a mind may, at least in part, be composed of innate neural structures or mental modules which have distinct, established, and evolutionarily developed functions. However, different definitions of "module" have been proposed by different authors.
It is used in theories of the modularity of mind and the closely related society of mind theory and was developed by Jerry Fodor. It became better known throughout cognitive psychology by means of his book, The Modularity of Mind (1983). The nine aspects he lists that make up a mental module are domain specificity, mandatory operation, limited ...
The relationship between domain general learning and domain specific learning (also known as the modularity debate or modularity of mind) has been an ongoing debate for evolutionary psychologists. [7] The modularity of mind or modularity debate states that the brain is constructed of neural structures (or modules) which have distinct functions.
The Philosophy of Psychology (1999). Phenomenal Consciousness: a naturalistic theory (2000). The Nature of the Mind: an introduction (2004). Consciousness: essays from a higher-order perspective (2005). The Architecture of the Mind: massive modularity and the flexibility of thought (2006).
The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press. ISBN 9780262062121. OCLC 43109956. Fodor, Jerry (2010). LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199548774. OCLC 470698989. Harnad, Stevan (1994). "Computation Is Just ...
Jerry Alan Fodor (/ ˈ f oʊ d ər / FOH-dər; April 22, 1935 – November 29, 2017) was an American philosopher and the author of works in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. [1]
The position is a close relative of modularity of mind, but is considered more general in that it does not necessarily entail all the assumptions of Fodorian modularity (e.g., informational encapsulation). Instead, it is properly described as a variant of psychological nativism. Other cognitive scientists also hold the mind to be modular ...
Instead of postulating 'pure' modularity, theorists have opted for a weaker version, domain-specificity implemented in functionally specialised neural circuits and computation (e.g. Jackendoff and Pinker's words, we must investigate language "not as a monolith but as a combination of components, some special to language, others rooted in more ...