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The English common law established the concepts of consensus ad idem, offer, acceptance and counter-offer. The leading case on counter-offer is Hyde v Wrench [1840]. [ 3 ] The phrase "Mirror-Image Rule" is rarely (if at all) used by English lawyers; but the concept remains valid, as in Gibson v Manchester City Council [1979], [ 4 ] and Butler ...
One cannot doubt that, as an ordinary rule of law, an acceptance of an offer made ought to be notified to the person who makes the offer, in order that the two minds may come together. Unless this is done the two minds may be apart, and there is not that consensus which is necessary according to the English law - I say nothing about the laws of ...
Common law contracts are accepted under a "mirror image" rule. [29] Under this rule, an acceptance must be an absolute and unqualified acceptance of all the terms of the offer. If there is any variation, even on an unimportant point, between the offer and the terms of its acceptance, there is no contract.
Under the mirror image rule, the terms of the final contract are those stated in the offer, that is, the first promise. The offeree must accept the offer as a whole without any variation, otherwise the acceptance will become invalid. [12]
The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") dispenses with the mirror image rule in § 2-207. [3] UCC § 2-207(1) provides that a "definite and seasonable expression of acceptance...operates as" an acceptance, even though it varies the terms of the original offer. Such an expression is typically interpreted as an acceptance when it purports to accept ...
This is typically reached through an offer and an acceptance which does not vary the offer's terms, which is known as the "mirror image rule". An offer is defined as a promise that is dependent on a certain act, promise, or forbearance given in exchange for the initial promise [ 26 ] An acceptance is simply the assent of the other contracting ...
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The comparison with a looking-glass hardly suggests the second element, the imagined judgment which is quite essential. The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another's mind." (Cooley, 1902, p. 153)