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The "cake" is only a metaphor; procedures for fair cake-cutting can be used to divide various kinds of resources, such as land estates, advertisement space or broadcast time. The prototypical procedure for fair cake-cutting is divide and choose, which is mentioned in the book of Genesis to resolve Abraham and Lot's conflict. This procedure ...
Divide and choose (also Cut and choose or I cut, you choose) is a procedure for fair division of a continuous resource, such as a cake, between two parties. It involves a heterogeneous good or resource ("the cake") and two partners who have different preferences over parts of the cake (both want as much of it as possible).
It was the first example of a continuous procedure in fair division. The knife is passed over the cake from the left end to the right. Any player may say stop when they think / of the cake is to the left of the knife, the cake is cut and the player who spoke gets that piece. Repeat with the remaining cake and players, the last player gets the ...
The Brams–Taylor procedure (BTP) is a procedure for envy-free cake-cutting.It explicated the first finite procedure to produce an envy-free division of a cake among any positive integer number of players. [1]
The simplest example is a moving-knife equivalent of the "I cut, you choose" scheme, first described by A.K.Austin as a prelude to his own procedure: [2] One player moves the knife across the cake, conventionally from left to right. The cake is cut when either player calls "stop", when he or she perceives the knife to be at the 50-50 point.
For other procedures for solving the same problem, see proportional cake-cutting. One advantage of lone-divider is that it can be modified to yield a symmetric fair cake-cutting procedure. Fair Division: Method of Lone Divider at Cut-the-Knot.
An envy-free cake-cutting is a kind of fair cake-cutting.It is a division of a heterogeneous resource ("cake") that satisfies the envy-free criterion, namely, that every partner feels that their allocated share is at least as good as any other share, according to their own subjective valuation.
There is a trivial randomized truthful mechanism for fair cake-cutting: select a single agent uniformly at random, and give him/her the entire cake. This mechanism is trivially truthful because it asks no questions. Moreover, it is fair in expectation: the expected value of each partner is exactly 1/n. However, the resulting allocation is not fair.