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A Vickrey auction is decision efficient (the winner is the bidder with the highest valuation) under the most general circumstances; [citation needed] it thus provides a baseline model against which the efficiency properties of other types of auctions can be posited. It is only ex-post efficient (sum of transfers equal to zero) if the seller is ...
A Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction is a type of sealed-bid auction of multiple items. Bidders submit bids that report their valuations for the items, without knowing the bids of the other bidders. The auction system assigns the items in a socially optimal manner: it charges each individual the harm they cause to other bidders. [1]
A well-known special case is the Vickrey auction, or the sealed second-bid auction. Here, there is only a single item, and the set contains + possible outcomes: either sell the item to one of the agents, or not to sell it at all. In step 3, the winner agent is paid 0 (since the total value of the others is 0) and the losers receive a payment ...
In a traditional auction, the seller offers an item for sale. Potential buyers are then free to bid on the item until the time period expires. The buyer with the highest offer wins the right to purchase the item for the price determined at the end of the auction. A reverse auction is different in that a single buyer offers a contract out for ...
[52] [53] What are effectively sealed first-price auctions are commonly called tendering for procurement by companies and organisations, particularly for government contracts and auctions for mining leases. [2] Vickrey auction, also known as a sealed-bid second-price auction. [54]
Vickrey was the first to use the tools of game theory to explain the dynamics of auctions. [5] In his seminal paper, Vickrey derived several auction equilibria, and provided an early revenue-equivalence result. The revenue equivalence theorem remains the centrepiece of modern auction theory. The Vickrey auction is named after him. [5]
A simple example of a WBB mechanism is the Vickrey auction, in which the operator wants to sell an object to one of n potential buyers. Each potential buyer bids a value, the highest bidder wins an object and pays the second-highest bid. As all bids are positive, the total payment is trivially positive too.
A classic example is the pair of auction mechanisms: first price auction and second price auction. First-price auction has a variant which is Bayesian-Nash incentive compatible; second-price auction is dominant-strategy-incentive-compatible, which is even stronger than Bayesian-Nash incentive compatible. The two mechanisms fulfill the ...