Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
Additionally, third parties who do not have standing may be able to sue under the next friend doctrine if the third party is an infant, mentally handicapped, or not a party to a contract. One example of a statutory exception to the prohibition of third party standing exists in the qui tam provision of the Civil False Claims Act .
Held that state taxpayers do not have standing to challenge to state tax laws in federal court. 9–0 Massachusetts v. EPA: 2007: States have standing to sue the EPA to enforce their views of federal law, in this case, the view that carbon dioxide was an air pollutant under the Clean Air Act. Cited Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. as precedent ...
Third party standing is a term of the law of civil procedure that describes when one party may file a lawsuit or assert a defense in which the rights of third parties are asserted. In the United States , this is generally prohibited, as a party can only assert his or her own rights and cannot raise the claims of right of a third party who is ...
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), is a United States Supreme Court case that involved issues concerning statutory standing in antitrust law.. The decision established the rule that indirect purchasers of goods or services along a supply chain cannot seek damages for antitrust violations committed by the original manufacturer or service provider, but it permitted such claims ...
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that the members of SCRAP—five law students from the George Washington University Law School—had standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution to challenge a nationwide railroad freight rate increase ...
The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the Case or Controversy Clause of Article III of the United States Constitution (found in Art. III, Section 2, Clause 1) as embodying two distinct limitations on exercise of judicial review: a bar on the issuance of advisory opinions, and a requirement that parties must have standing.
The judge said the PSC "plead facts sufficient, if believed, to show President Hartzell suspended PSC-UT because of the group's expressed viewpoint."
The Court specifically rejected the idea – first embraced by the district court – that the lack of an alternative plaintiff could justify relaxation of the standing requirement. The Court stated: "The assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing." [4]