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A language-game (German: Sprachspiel) is a philosophical concept developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, referring to simple examples of language use and the actions into which the language is woven. Wittgenstein argued that a word or even a sentence has meaning only as a result of the "rule" of the "game" being played.
Zettel (German: "slip(s) of paper") is a collection of assorted remarks by Ludwig Wittgenstein, first published in 1967.It contains several discussions of philosophical psychology and of the tendency in philosophy to try for a synoptic view of phenomena. [1]
Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (/ ˈ v ɪ t ɡ ən ʃ t aɪ n,-s t aɪ n / VIT-gən-s(h)tyne, [7] Austrian German: [ˈluːdvɪk ˈjoːsɛf ˈjoːhan ˈvɪtɡn̩ʃtaɪn]; 26 April 1889 – 29 April 1951) was an Austrian philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.
However, Wittgenstein took the line that 'There is indeed no such thing as phenomenology, but there are phenomenological problems.' [5] He was content to regard Goethe's observations as a kind of logic or geometry. Wittgenstein took some of his examples from the Runge letter included at the end of the "Farbenlehre", e.g. "White is the lightest ...
On Certainty (German: Über Gewissheit, original spelling Über Gewißheit) is a philosophical book composed from notes written by Ludwig Wittgenstein over four separate periods in the eighteen months before his death on 29 April 1951.
Philosophical Investigations (German: Philosophische Untersuchungen) is a work by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, published posthumously in 1953.. Philosophical Investigations is divided into two parts, consisting of what Wittgenstein calls, in the preface, Bemerkungen, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe as "remarks".
Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough (German: Bemerkungen über Frazers "The Golden Bough") is a collection of Ludwig Wittgenstein's thoughts on James George Frazer's The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion. The commentary was initially published in 1967, [1] with an English edition in 1979.
On their reading, Wittgenstein indeed meant that some things are shown when we reflect on the logic of our language, but what is shown is not that something is the case, as if we could somehow think it (and thus understand what Wittgenstein tries to show us) but for some reason we just could not say it.