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The Strategic Hamlet Program was exposed as an almost complete failure in the aftermath of the November 1, 1963 coup that left Diem and his brother Nhu murdered. US officials discovered, for example, that only 20% of the 8600 hamlets that the Diem regime had reported "Complete" met the minimum American standards of security and readiness.
The Strategic Hamlet Program effectively ended in November 1963 when the Diem government was overthrown by the army and Diem was killed. Most of the hamlets were subsequently abandoned and peasants moved back to their old homes. [8] The Strategic Hamlet Program highlighted the schism in U.S. policy that would continue throughout the Vietnam War.
The program failed due to peasant resistance, poor management, and disruption by the VC using guerrilla and terrorist tactics. In 1961, the government embarked on the Strategic Hamlet Program, designed partly by Robert Thompson, a British counter-insurgency expert. The idea was to move rural dwellers into fortified villages in which they would ...
The South Vietnamese government suspended the Strategic Hamlet Program, effectively ending it. A U.S. AID official reported that three-fourths of the Strategic Hamlets in Long An province had already been destroyed by the VC or the inhabitants themselves. [53] 7 December
The concept of "strategic hamlets" was formulated as a part of Operation Sunrise, with the operation acting as a 'test area' for the Strategic Hamlet Program which developed from the operation. [2] [3] As part of the broader Hearts and Minds campaign the operation failed to have the desired impact.
[5] [16] The GVN's "Strategic Hamlet" program for example boasted much progress, but this was primarily on paper, and ineffective in halting VC infiltration, terror, and organizing efforts. [5] [16] ARVN units were often moulded in the American image and style, but without the training or technical knowledge to execute effectively.
The program called for rural people to provide manpower and labor to build and defend the strategic hamlets. It was an ambitious program which projected that 7,000 strategic hamlets would be built by the end of 1962 and 12,000 by the end of 1963, thus consolidating nearly all the rural population of South Vietnam. [10] 4 February
[25] [26] Another person in this group was Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo, an undetected communist agent who was deliberately fomenting infighting among the officers and mismanaging the Strategic Hamlet Program in order to destabilise the Saigon government. [27]