Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
He further speculates that all information-bearing systems may be conscious, leading him to entertain the possibility of conscious thermostats and a qualified panpsychism he calls panprotopsychism. Chalmers maintains a formal agnosticism on the issue, even conceding that the viability of panpsychism places him at odds with the majority of his ...
Panpsychism is a class of theories that believe that all physical things are conscious. John Searle distinguished it from neutral monism as well as property dualism, which he identified as a form of dualism. [7] However, some neutral monist theories are panpsychist and some panpsychist theories are neutral monist. However, the two do not always ...
The term panpsychism comes from the Greek pan (πᾶν: "all, everything, whole") and psyche (ψυχή: "soul, mind"). [7]: 1 The use of "psyche" is controversial because it is synonymous with "soul", a term usually taken to refer to something supernatural; more common terms now found in the literature include mind, mental properties, mental aspect, and experience.
Chalmers believes that an adequate theory of consciousness can only come by solving both the hard and easy problems. On top of discovering brain states associated with conscious experience, science must also discover why and how certain brain states are accompanied by experience. [6] This is what Chalmers attempts to do in The Conscious Mind.
Chalmers describes his overall view as "naturalistic dualism", [1] but he says panpsychism is in a sense a form of physicalism, [54] as does Strawson. [120] Proponents of panpsychism argue it solves the hard problem of consciousness parsimoniously by making consciousness a fundamental feature of reality.
David Chalmers, who explores a double-aspect view of information, with similarities to Kenneth Sayre's information-based neutral monism J. A. Scott Kelso , The Complementary Nature (MIT Press, 2006) attempts to reconcile what it calls "the philosophy of complementary pairs" with the science of coordination dynamics.
David Chalmers argues against quantum consciousness. He instead discusses how quantum mechanics may relate to dualistic consciousness. [61] Chalmers is skeptical that any new physics can resolve the hard problem of consciousness. [62] [63] [64] He argues that quantum theories of consciousness suffer from the same weakness as more conventional ...
In particular, they suggest that, pace Chalmers, people and zombies would have the same epistemic situation even though the contents of their situations would be different. For instance, a person's phenomenal concept would have content of a phenomenal state, while the "schmenomenal" concept of a zombie would have content about a "schmenomenal ...