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The apparent gap between "is" statements and "ought" statements, when combined with Hume's fork, renders "ought" statements of dubious validity.Hume's fork is the idea that all items of knowledge are based either on logic and definitions, or else on observation.
Is–ought fallacy [107] – deduce a conclusion about what ought to be, on the basis of what is. Naturalistic fallacy fallacy [108] (anti-naturalistic fallacy) [109] – inferring an impossibility to infer any instance of ought from is from the general invalidity of is-ought fallacy, mentioned above.
The term naturalistic fallacy is sometimes used to label the problematic inference of an ought from an is (the is–ought problem). [3] Michael Ridge relevantly elaborates that "[t]he intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the naturalistic features of things do not entail or even support evaluative conclusions."
For example, an invalid inference "Because everybody ought to be equal, there are no innate genetic differences between people" is an instance of the moralistic fallacy. Where the naturalistic fallacy attempts to move from an "is" to an "ought" statement, the moralistic fallacy attempts to move from an "ought" to an "is" statement.
G. I. Joe fallacy, the tendency to think that knowing about cognitive bias is enough to overcome it. [65] Gambler's fallacy, the tendency to think that future probabilities are altered by past events, when in reality they are unchanged. The fallacy arises from an erroneous conceptualization of the law of large numbers. For example, "I've ...
An example of a language dependent fallacy is given as a debate as to who in humanity are learners: the wise or the ignorant. [18]: 3 A language-independent fallacy is, for example: "Coriscus is different from Socrates." "Socrates is a man." "Therefore, Coriscus is different from a man." [18]: 4
The is-ought problem and the naturalistic fallacy: According to David Hume, it is hard to see how moral propositions featuring the relation ought could ever be deduced from ordinary is propositions, such as "the being of a God." [80] Divine command theory is thus guilty of deducing moral oughts from ordinary ises about God's commands. [81]
Closely connected with begging the question is the fallacy of circular reasoning (circulus in probando), a fallacy in which the reasoner begins with the conclusion. [22] The individual components of a circular argument can be logically valid because if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true, and does not lack relevance.