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The theory of subjective expected utility combines two concepts: first, a personal utility function, and second, a personal probability distribution (usually based on Bayesian probability theory). This theoretical model has been known for its clear and elegant structure and is considered by some researchers to be "the most brilliant axiomatic ...
In decision theory, the von Neumann–Morgenstern (VNM) utility theorem demonstrates that rational choice under uncertainty involves making decisions that take the form of maximizing the expected value of some cardinal utility function. This function is known as the von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function.
The Allais paradox is a choice problem designed by Maurice Allais () to show an inconsistency of actual observed choices with the predictions of expected utility theory. . The Allais paradox demonstrates that individuals rarely make rational decisions consistently when required to do so immediat
Generalized expected utility is a decision-making metric based on any of a variety of theories that attempt to resolve some discrepancies between expected utility theory and empirical observations, concerning choice under risky (probabilistic) or uncertain circumstances.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is an axiom of decision theory which codifies the intuition that a choice between and should not depend on the quality of a third, unrelated outcome . There are several different variations of this axiom, which are generally equivalent under mild conditions.
In decision theory, subjective expected utility is the attractiveness of an economic opportunity as perceived by a decision-maker in the presence of risk.Characterizing the behavior of decision-makers as using subjective expected utility was promoted and axiomatized by L. J. Savage in 1954 [1] [2] following previous work by Ramsey and von Neumann. [3]
In this case, the expected utility of Lottery A is 14.4 (= .90(16) + .10(12)) and the expected utility of Lottery B is 14 (= .50(16) + .50(12)) [clarification needed], so the person would prefer Lottery A. Expected utility theory implies that the same utilities could be used to predict the person's behavior in all possible lotteries. If, for ...
In decision theory, the Ellsberg paradox (or Ellsberg's paradox) is a paradox in which people's decisions are inconsistent with subjective expected utility theory. John Maynard Keynes published a version of the paradox in 1921. [1] Daniel Ellsberg popularized the paradox in his 1961 paper, "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms". [2]