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ARP4761, Guidelines for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Aircraft, Systems, and Equipment describes recommended processes for assessing safety for new aircraft and equipment design as well as significant changes to existing designs for compliance with the safety requirements of FAR 25.1309 and FAR 23.1309. [4]
The Functional Safety process is focused on identifying functional failure conditions leading to hazards. Functional Hazard Analyses / Assessments are central to determining hazards. FHA is performed early in aircraft design, first as an Aircraft Functional Hazard Analysis (AFHA) and then as a System Functional Hazard Analysis (SFHA).
A root cause analysis identifies the set of multiple causes that together might create a potential accident. Root cause techniques have been successfully borrowed from other disciplines and adapted to meet the needs of the system safety concept, most notably the tree structure from fault tree analysis, which was originally an engineering technique. [7]
Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA) is one of three analytical methods which, taken together, form a Common Cause Analysis (CCA) in aircraft safety engineering under SAE ARP4761. [1] The other two methods are Particular Risks Analysis (PRA) and Common Mode Analysis (CMA). Aircraft system safety requires the independence of failure conditions for ...
ARP4754(), Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems, is a published standard from SAE International, dealing with the development processes which support certification of Aircraft systems, addressing "the complete aircraft development cycle, from systems requirements through systems verification."
DO-178B, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification is a guideline dealing with the safety of safety-critical software used in certain airborne systems. It was jointly developed by the safety-critical working group RTCA SC-167 of the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) and WG-12 of the European ...
No Effect - Failure has no impact on safety, aircraft operation, or crew workload. DO-178C alone is not intended to guarantee software safety aspects. Safety attributes in the design and as implemented as functionality must receive additional mandatory system safety tasks to drive and show objective evidence of meeting explicit safety requirements.
The technique uses system analysis methods to determine the safety requirements to protect any individual process component, e.g. a vessel, pipeline, or pump. [1] The safety requirements of individual components are integrated into a complete platform safety system, including liquid containment and emergency support systems such as fire and gas ...