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Arrow's theorem assumes as background that any non-degenerate social choice rule will satisfy: [15]. Unrestricted domain — the social choice function is a total function over the domain of all possible orderings of outcomes, not just a partial function.
The work culminated in what Arrow called the "General Possibility Theorem," better known thereafter as Arrow's (impossibility) theorem. The theorem states that, absent restrictions on either individual preferences or neutrality of the constitution to feasible alternatives, there exists no social choice rule that satisfies a set of plausible ...
Arrow's impossibility theorem is a key result on social welfare functions, showing an important difference between social and consumer choice: whereas it is possible to construct a rational (non-self-contradictory) decision procedure for consumers based only on ordinal preferences, it is impossible to do the same in the social choice setting ...
Kenneth Joseph Arrow (August 23, 1921 – February 21, 2017) was an American economist, mathematician and political theorist.He received the John Bates Clark Medal in 1957, and the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1972, along with John Hicks.
Non-dictatorship is one of the necessary conditions in Arrow's impossibility theorem. [1] In Social Choice and Individual Values , Kenneth Arrow defines non-dictatorship as: There is no voter i {\displaystyle i} in { 1 , ..., n } such that, for every set of orderings in the domain of the constitution, and every pair of social states x and y , x ...
Social choice theory is a branch of welfare economics that extends the theory of rational choice to collective decision-making. [1] Social choice studies the behavior of different mathematical procedures (social welfare functions) used to combine individual preferences into a coherent whole.
Arrow's impossibility theorem shows that no reasonable (non-random, non-dictatorial) ranked voting system can satisfy IIA. However, Arrow's theorem does not apply to rated voting methods. These can pass IIA under certain assumptions, but fail it if they are not met. Methods that unconditionally pass IIA include sortition and random dictatorship.
The theorem tells us that no taxation is Pareto-efficient and that taxation with redistribution is Pareto-inefficient. Because of this, most of the literature is focused on finding solutions where given there is a tax structure, how can the tax structure prescribe a situation where no person could be made better off by a change in available taxes.