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After NIST's announcement regarding the finalists and the alternate candidates, various intellectual property concerns were voiced, notably surrounding lattice-based schemes such as Kyber and NewHope. NIST holds signed statements from submitting groups clearing any legal claims, but there is still a concern that third parties could raise claims.
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC), sometimes referred to as quantum-proof, quantum-safe, or quantum-resistant, is the development of cryptographic algorithms (usually public-key algorithms) that are currently thought to be secure against a cryptanalytic attack by a quantum computer.
Dilithium was selected by the NIST as the basis for a digital signature standard. [1] According to a message from Ray Perlner, writing on behalf of the NIST PQC team, the NIST module-LWE signing standard is to be based on version 3.1 of the Dilithium specification.
Kyber is a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) designed to be resistant to cryptanalytic attacks with future powerful quantum computers.It is used to establish a shared secret between two communicating parties without an attacker in the transmission system being able to decrypt it.
DIACAP defined a DoD-wide formal and standard set of activities, general tasks and a management structure process for the certification and accreditation (C&A) of a DoD IS which maintained the information assurance (IA) posture throughout the system's life cycle.
A presentation once anticipated that BLISS would become a potential candidate for standardization, however it was not submitted to NIST. NIST's criteria for selecting schemes to standardize includes side-channel resistance. However, BLISS and derivative schemes like GALACTICS have shown vulnerabilities to a number of side-channel and timing ...
Falcon is a post-quantum signature scheme selected by the NIST at the fourth round of the post-quantum standardisation process. It was designed by Thomas Prest, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Jeffrey Hoffstein, Paul Kirchner, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Thomas Pornin, Thomas Ricosset, Gregor Seiler, William Whyte, and Zhenfei Zhang.
This, and the overall delivery and timing of the announcement, in the absence of post-quantum standards, raised considerable speculation about whether NSA had found weaknesses e.g. in elliptic-curve algorithms or others, or was trying to distance itself from an exclusive focus on ECC for non-technical reasons.