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The face of the other in this sense looms above the other person and traces "where God passes." God (the infinite Other ) here refers to the God of which one cannot refuse belief in Its history, that is the God who appears in traditional belief and of scripture and not some conceptual God of philosophy or ontotheology .
For Levinas, the Other is not knowable and cannot be made into an object of the self, as is done by traditional metaphysics (which Levinas called "ontology"). Levinas prefers to think of philosophy as the "wisdom of love" rather than the "love of wisdom" (the usual translation of the Greek "φιλοσοφία").
Face-to-face (philosophy), a philosophical concept described by Emmanuel Lévinas based on the idea that people are responsible to one another in their face-to-face encounters Face-to-face interaction , a concept in sociology, linguistics and communication studies involving social interaction carried out without any mediating technology
The infinity of the Other allowed Lévinas to derive other aspects of philosophy and science as secondary to that ethic; thus: The others that obsess me in the Other do not affect me as examples of the same genus united with my neighbor, by resemblance or common nature, individuations of the human race, or chips off the old block. . . . The ...
Levinas places heavy emphasis on the physical presence involved in meeting the other. He argues that only a face-to-face encounter allows true connection with Infinity, because of the incessance of this type of interaction. Written words and other words do not suffice because they have become past by the time the subject perceives them.
For Emmanuel Levinas, meontology was whatever had meaning beyond ontology, the ethical primary demand of the other in a face-to-face encounter. According to Levinas, meontology refers not to another being but to an inability to be that leads to a transcendent realm "other than being". [2] However, Levinas suggested that meontology, as the ...
Language as saying is an ethical openness to the other; as that which is said – reduced to a fixed identity or synchronized presence – it is an ontological closure of the other.' [1] The complication Levinas introduces into his analysis of the face-to-face gives his ethics a further reach toward the kind of universalist ethics of a humanism:
For Levinas, the Other is given context in ethics and responsibility; we should think of the Other as anyone and everyone outside ourselves. According to Levinas, our initial interactions with the Other occur before we form a will—the ability to make choices. The Other addresses us and we respond: even the absence of response is a response.