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As the U.S. Army hones its core competencies over the coming years it cannot afford to build a baseline of learning, nor develop the next generation of Army leaders, against the backdrop of a training scenario focused solely on one particular threat. The days of practicing air-land battle against a structured “Krasnovian” threat, modelled ...
Agoglia, John F.. Measuring progress in conflict environments (MPICE): a metrics framework. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010.. U.S. Army Training Publication 3-57.80: Civil Military Engagement, October, 2013.. U.S. Army Training Publication 3-05.1: Unconventional warfare, September 6, 2013.. U.S. Army Training Publication 3-57.10: Civil Affairs Support to Populace ...
The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pownall, Lieutenant Jerry D. “The Meuse Argonne Offensive.” US Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, Fort Huachuca, AZ. 1980. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. ADP 6-0: Mission Command. Command and Control of Army Forces ...
Tue, 10/08/2019 - 8:57pm. Trained But Undeveloped: Rethinking Combat Medic Sustainment. Franklin C. Annis. In the fall of 2009, I found myself as a Platoon Leader of 26 Combat Medics (68W) deployed to Iraq. To my horror, I discovered the vast majority of my medics had never treated a “real” patient.
The Army Signal Corps is at a crossroads. Is the purpose of the Signal Corps to comply with network security directives or accomplish the mission while accepting prudent risk? The answer is not clear.
To remain relevant in the future operational environment, CA must counter enemy hybrid warfare in the expanded battlefield, specifically in operational and tactical support areas, as part of an integrated security team through civil reconnaissance, civil network analysis, and civil network development.
Anyone with at least one trip to Iraq, Afghanistan, or a Combined Training Center knows the basics. While aerostats, aloft over their FOBs, are incredible leverage in attacking the network simply focusing on attacking the device and killing the insurgent emplacing it is a very narrow way to utilize aerostats and can easily become the default ...
The second issue was the proficiency level of the ROK Army by June, 1949. KMAG advisors believed that the Korean Army was much like the American Army of 1775: save for the intense national pride there was little to recommend them as an Army. [iv] Few units had any additional training beyond the basic course by late 1949. Instead most ROK ...
A clandestine network, [9] including an "underground" for covert communication and support, "auxiliary networks" that provide logistical support to the resistance, and a robust "shadow government" capable of maintaining a semblance of civilian order and leadership during occupation, is crucial for sustaining resistance efforts. Training and ...
Mad Scientist # 16: The US Army is moving to field the next generation of cyber warfighters, and the need to identify, train, and develop these cyber professionals is becoming increasingly critical. Training Future Cyber Officers: An Analysis of the US Army ROTC’s Efforts to Produce Quality Junior Cyber Officers | Small Wars Journal