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Nash proved that if mixed strategies (where a player chooses probabilities of using various pure strategies) are allowed, then every game with a finite number of players in which each player can choose from finitely many pure strategies has at least one Nash equilibrium, which might be a pure strategy for each player or might be a probability ...
However, many games do have pure strategy Nash equilibria (e.g. the Coordination game, the Prisoner's dilemma, the Stag hunt). Further, games can have both pure strategy and mixed strategy equilibria. An easy example is the pure coordination game, where in addition to the pure strategies (A,A) and (B,B) a mixed equilibrium exists in which both ...
Mixed strategy 1 / 2 Y and 1 / 2 Z will dominate pure strategy X for Player 2, and thus X can be eliminated from the rationalizable strategies for P2. For Player 1, U is dominated by the pure strategy D. For player 2, Y is dominated by the pure strategy Z. This leaves M dominating D for Player 1.
In game theory, a strictly determined game is a two-player zero-sum game that has at least one Nash equilibrium with both players using pure strategies.The value of a strictly determined game is equal to the value of the equilibrium outcome.
In game theory, the best response is the strategy (or strategies) which produces the most favorable outcome for a player, taking other players' strategies as given. [1] The concept of a best response is central to John Nash's best-known contribution, the Nash equilibrium, the point at which each player in a game has selected the best response (or one of the best responses) to the other players ...
For any separable game there exists at least one Nash equilibrium where player i mixes at most + pure strategies. [2] Whereas an equilibrium strategy for a non-separable game may require an uncountably infinite support, a separable game is guaranteed to have at least one Nash equilibrium with finitely supported mixed strategies.
Anshelevich et al. studied network design games and showed that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium always exists and the price of stability of this game is at most the nth harmonic number in directed graphs. For undirected graphs Anshelevich and others presented a tight bound on the price of stability of 4/3 for a single source and two players case.
The Lemke–Howson algorithm is an algorithm that computes a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, named after its inventors, Carlton E. Lemke and J. T. Howson. [1] It is said to be "the best known among the combinatorial algorithms for finding a Nash equilibrium", [2] although more recently the Porter-Nudelman-Shoham algorithm [3] has outperformed on a number of benchmarks.