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Type physicalism (also known as reductive materialism, type identity theory, mind–brain identity theory, and identity theory of mind) is a physicalist theory in the philosophy of mind. It asserts that mental events can be grouped into types, and can then be correlated with types of physical events in the brain .
Smart's identity theory dealt with some extremely long-standing objections to physicalism by comparing the mind–brain identity thesis to other identity theses well known from science, such as the thesis that lightning is an electrical discharge, or that the morning star is the evening star.
In the philosophy of mind, functionalism is the thesis that each and every mental state (for example, the state of having a belief, of having a desire, or of being in pain) is constituted solely by its functional role, which means its causal relation to other mental states, sensory inputs, and behavioral outputs. [1]
The philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of the mind and its relation to the body and the external world.. The mind–body problem is a paradigmatic issue in philosophy of mind, although a number of other issues are addressed, such as the hard problem of consciousness and the nature of particular mental states.
As a theory in the scientific sense, eliminativists maintain, folk psychology must be evaluated on the basis of its predictive power and explanatory success as a research program for the investigation of the mind/brain.
In philosophy of mind, the extended mind thesis says that the mind does not exclusively reside in the brain or even the body, but extends into the physical world. [3] The thesis proposes that some objects in the external environment can be part of a cognitive process and in that way function as extensions of the mind itself.
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Multiple realizability has been used as an argument against type-identity theory, against reductionist theories of mind in general, for functionalist theories of mind, and even against functionalist theories of mind. Starting in the 1960s, Hilary Putnam used multiple realizability as an argument against type-identity theory.