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For instance if a player prefers "Yes", then that set of strategies is not a Nash equilibrium. But if every player prefers not to switch (or is indifferent between switching and not) then the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. Thus, each strategy in a Nash equilibrium is a best response to the other players' strategies in that equilibrium ...
If a strictly dominant strategy exists for one player in a game, that player will play that strategy in each of the game's Nash equilibria.If both players have a strictly dominant strategy, the game has only one unique Nash equilibrium, referred to as a "dominant strategy equilibrium".
The two pure strategy Nash equilibria are unfair; one player consistently does better than the other. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is inefficient: the players will miscoordinate with probability 13/25, leaving each player with an expected return of 6/5 (less than the payoff of 2 from each's less favored pure strategy equilibrium).
While Nash proved that every finite game has a Nash equilibrium, not all have pure strategy Nash equilibria. For an example of a game that does not have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, see Matching pennies. However, many games do have pure strategy Nash equilibria (e.g. the Coordination game, the Prisoner's dilemma, the Stag hunt ...
This is because the game has no strictly dominant strategy, so it requires players to consider what others will do. For Nash equilibrium to be played, players would need to assume both that everyone else is rational and that there is common knowledge of rationality. However, this is a strong assumption.
The best response mappings agree (i.e., cross) at three points. The first two Nash equilibria are in the top left and bottom right corners, where one player chooses one strategy, the other player chooses the opposite strategy. The third Nash equilibrium is a mixed strategy which lies along the diagonal from the bottom left to top right corners.
The dominant-strategy revelation-principle says that every social-choice function that can be implemented in dominant-strategies can be implemented by a DSIC mechanism. The Bayesian–Nash revelation-principle says that every social-choice function that can be implemented in Bayesian–Nash equilibrium ( Bayesian game , i.e. game of incomplete ...
Risk dominance and payoff dominance are two related refinements of the Nash equilibrium (NE) solution concept in game theory, defined by John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten.A Nash equilibrium is considered payoff dominant if it is Pareto superior to all other Nash equilibria in the game. 1 When faced with a choice among equilibria, all players would agree on the payoff dominant equilibrium since ...