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It is based on the premise that the mind and culture are inseparable and mutually constitutive. The concept involves two propositions: firstly, that people are shaped by their culture, and secondly, that culture is shaped by its people. [2] Cultural psychology aims to define culture, its nature, and its function concerning psychological phenomena.
This view further holds that genetic and environmental influences on organismal development are so closely interdependent that they are inseparable from one another. [1] Historically, it has often been confused with the statistical concept of gene-environment interaction . [ 2 ]
In the philosophy of mind, mind–body dualism denotes either that mental phenomena are non-physical, [1] or that the mind and body are distinct and separable. [2] Thus, it encompasses a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, as well as between subject and object, and is contrasted with other positions, such as physicalism and enactivism, in the mind–body problem.
The term is also used in describing a revelation of the oneness of things previously believed to be different. Such insight into the unity of things is a kind of immanence , and is found in various non-dualist and dualist traditions.
The principle of identity of indiscernibles, on the other hand, is more controversial in making the converse claim that if two entities have the same properties then they must be identical. [3] This entails that "no two distinct things exactly resemble each other". [1] Note that these are all second-order expressions.
Dyophysitism (/ d aɪ ˈ ɒ f ɪ s aɪ t ɪ z əm /; [2] from Greek δύο dyo, "two" and φύσις physis, "nature") is the Christological position that Jesus Christ is one person of one substance and one hypostasis, with two distinct, inseparable natures: divine and human.
Ockham was opposed to the idea, arguing that whenever there is any distinction or non-identity in reality, then two contradictory statements can be made. But contradictory statements, he goes on arguing, cannot be truly asserted unless the realities they stand for are either (1) distinct real things (2) distinct concepts or (3) a thing and a ...
The use of different terms to label these two types of contributions to human existence seemed inappropriate in light of the biopsychosocial position I have taken. She quotes Steven Pinker 's summary of the problems with the terms sex and gender: "Part of it is a new prissiness—many people today are as squeamish about sexual dimorphism as the ...