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Passion's Triumph over Reason: A History of the Moral Imagination from Spenser to Rochester, is a book by historian Christopher Tilmouth, first published by Oxford University Press in 2007. It is a study of English moral and philosophical attitudes to passion in the late sixteenth to seventeenth centuries.
Crary's first monograph, Beyond Moral Judgment, [12] discusses how literature and feminism help to reframe moral presuppositions. Her Inside Ethics [13] argues that ethics in disability studies and animal studies is stunted by a lack of moral imagination, caused by a narrow understanding of rationality and by a philosophy severed from literature and art.
To achieve such free deeds, we must cultivate our moral imagination, our ability to imaginatively create ethically sound and practical solutions to new situations, in fact, to forge our own ethical principles and to transform these flexibly as needed - not in the service of our own egotistical purposes, but in the face of new demands and unique ...
Moral imagination usually describes the mental capacity to find answers to ethical questions and dilemmas through the process of imagination and visualization. Different definitions of "moral imagination" can be found in the literature.
Moral intellectualism or ethical intellectualism is a view in meta-ethics according to which genuine moral knowledge must take the form of arriving at discursive moral judgements about what one should do. [1] One way of understanding this is that doing what is right is a reflection of what any being knows is right. [2]
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Moral injury is a relatively new concept that seems to describe what many feel: a sense that their fundamental understanding of right and wrong has been violated, and the grief, numbness or guilt that often ensues. Here, you will meet combat veterans struggling with the moral and ethical ambiguities of war.
Ethical intuitionism (also called moral intuitionism) is a view or family of views in moral epistemology (and, on some definitions, metaphysics). It is foundationalism applied to moral knowledge, the thesis that some moral truths can be known non-inferentially (i.e., known without one needing to infer them from other truths one believes).