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Neal spent $100 in reliance on the contract, which constituted Neal's reliance interest. Since reliance damages equal to the value of the reliance interest of the injured party, Matt owes Neal $100. This puts Neal in the same economic position as if the contract never happened. In a promissory estoppel context, consider the following example:
In many jurisdictions of the United States, promissory estoppel is an alternative to consideration as a basis for enforcing a promise. It is also sometimes called detrimental reliance. The American Law Institute in 1932 included the principle of estoppel into § 90 of the Restatement of Contracts, stating:
An Appellate Division, First Department panel rejected the reliance-based argument of promissory estoppel by the plaintiff, indicating that he would not suffer an unfair injury if the statute of ...
Promissory estoppel is a separate cause of action to breach of contract, requiring separate elements to be shown. It has the effect that in many contract like situations, the requirement of consideration need not be present. [5] The elements of promissory estoppel are: an express or implied promise;
Estoppel forms part of the rules of equity, which were originally administered in the Chancery courts. Estoppel in English law is a doctrine that may be used in certain situations to prevent a person from relying upon certain rights, or upon a set of facts (e.g. words said or actions performed) which is different from an earlier set of facts.
Drennan v. Star Paving Company, 51 Cal. 2d 409 (1958), was a California Supreme Court case in which the court held that a party who has detrimentally relied on an offer that is revoked prior to acceptance may assert promissory estoppel to recover damages. [1]
28. In Combe v Combe Denning L.J. limited the application of promissory estoppel, as he expounded the doctrine, to ensure that it did not displace the doctrine of consideration. His Lordship's solution of the problem was to hold that the promise should not itself be a cause of action, but merely the foundation of a defensive equity.
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment 'below' ('at first instance') on the promissory estoppel point. Arden LJ held that Foakes v Beer [1] applied, but referring to the ‘brilliant dictum’ of Denning J in High Trees, held that promissory estoppel could aid Mr Collier. Where he had been assured that he could repay only part of the debt ...