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Therefore, the sole equilibrium in the Bertrand model emerges when both firms establish a price equal to unit cost, known as the competitive price. [9] It is to highlight that the Bertrand equilibrium is a weak Nash-equilibrium. The firms lose nothing by deviating from the competitive price: it is an equilibrium simply because each firm can ...
The Bertrand–Nash equilibrium of this model is to have all (or at least two) firms setting the price equal to marginal cost. The argument is simple: if one firm sets a price above marginal cost then another firm can undercut it by a small amount (often called epsilon undercutting , where epsilon represents an arbitrarily small amount) thus ...
As a solution to the Bertrand paradox in economics, it has been suggested that each firm produces a somewhat differentiated product, and consequently faces a demand curve that is downward-sloping for all levels of the firm's price.
Bertrand's result is paradoxical because if the number of firms goes from one to two, the price decreases from the monopoly price to the competitive price and stays at the same level as the number of firms increases further. This is not very realistic, as in reality, markets featuring a small number of firms with market power typically charge a ...
The Bertrand equilibrium is the same as the competitive result. [ 53 ] [ clarification needed ] Each firm produces where P = MC {\displaystyle P={\text{MC}}} , resulting in zero profits. [ 49 ] A generalization of the Bertrand model is the Bertrand–Edgeworth model , which allows for capacity constraints and a more general cost function.
Unlike the Bertrand paradox, the situation of both companies charging zero-profit prices is not an equilibrium, since either company can raise its price and generate profits. Nor is the situation where one company charges less than the other an equilibrium, since the lower price company can profitably raise its price towards the higher price ...
Agricultural markets are a context where the cobweb model might apply, since there is a lag between planting and harvesting (Kaldor, 1934, p. 133–134 gives two agricultural examples: rubber and corn). Suppose for example that as a result of unexpectedly bad weather, farmers go to market with an unusually small crop of strawberries.
The Stackelberg model can be solved to find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium or equilibria (SPNE), i.e. the strategy profile that serves best each player, given the strategies of the other player and that entails every player playing in a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.