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Service and indoctrination under the communist system prior to army recruitment made the typical PAVN fighter a bit older and more seasoned than his American or ARVN opponent. Throughout the conflict, PAVN defections and surrenders were extremely low, especially compared to that of the VC, a testimony to their motivation and organization. [3]
Without direct support of the U.S., and suffering from stresses caused by dwindling aid, the ARVN was ill-prepared to confront the highly motivated PAVN, and despite the on paper superiority of the ARVN, the PAVN quickly secured victory within two months and captured Saigon on 30 April 1975, ending the 20 year Vietnam war.
ARVN forces counter-attacked and succeeded in driving some of the PAVN out of South Vietnam, though they did retain control of northern Quảng Trị Province near the DMZ. At the end of 1972, Operation Linebacker II helped achieve a negotiated end to the war between the U.S. and the Hanoi government.
Member of a Viet Cong Main Force Unit. They shared common arms, procedures, tactics, organization and personnel with the PAVN. VC and PAVN battle tactics comprised a flexible mix of guerrilla and conventional warfare battle tactics used by Viet Cong (VC) and the North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) to defeat their U.S. and South Vietnamese (GVN/ARVN) opponents during the Vietnam War.
The ARVN II Corps commander, General Phạm Văn Phú, reported to his government that the PAVN were firmly in control of Ban Me Thuot. [6]: 151 Captured in the PAVN assault on Ban Me Thuot were 14 foreigners, including American missionaries with a six-year-old daughter and Paul Struharik, the provincial representative of the United States. The ...
VC/PAVN logistics were marked by austerity, but sufficient supplies, equipment and material were on hand to furnish final victory. Consumption levels were much less than those of their American/ARVN opponents. It is estimated that a VC/PAVN division in the south typically required only 15 tons of supplies per day. [7]
[16]: 56 Quảng Trị was clear of PAVN/VC troops by midday on 1 February, and ARVN units with U.S. air support had cleared Tri Buu Village of PAVN troops. The remnants of the 812th, having been hit hard by ARVN defenders and US airpower and ground troops on the outskirts of the city, particularly artillery and helicopters broke up into small ...
The PAVN's strategic raids campaign in the vast region south of the Hải Vân Pass had accomplished three things that placed PAVN forces in an excellent position to begin a major offensive. First, although PAVN casualties were very high, the campaign had severely depleted the ARVN of experienced leaders and soldiers.