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He then goes on to present panpsychism as what he describes to be "a way of accepting the reality of consciousness" while being "entirely consistent with the facts of empirical science". The book defines panpsychism as the view that “consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality,” and everything, including fundamental ...
The quantum mind or quantum consciousness is a group of hypotheses proposing that local physical laws and interactions from classical mechanics or connections between neurons alone cannot explain consciousness, [1] positing instead that quantum-mechanical phenomena, such as entanglement and superposition that cause nonlocalized quantum effects, interacting in smaller features of the brain than ...
The notion that quantum physics must be the underlying mechanism for consciousness first emerged in the 1990s, when Nobel Prize-winning physicist Roger Penrose, Ph.D., and anesthesiologist Stuart ...
Levine does not think that the explanatory gap means that consciousness is not physical; he is open to the idea that the explanatory gap is only an epistemological problem for physicalism. [43] In contrast, Chalmers thinks that the hard problem of consciousness does show that consciousness is not physical.
The field theories of consciousness do not appear to have been as widely discussed as other quantum consciousness theories, such as those of Penrose, Stapp or Bohm. [18] However, David Chalmers [19] argues against quantum consciousness. He instead discusses how quantum mechanics may relate to dualistic consciousness. [20]
While other theories assert that consciousness emerges as the complexity of the computations performed by cerebral neurons increases, [4] [5] Orch OR posits that consciousness is based on non-computable quantum processing performed by qubits formed collectively on cellular microtubules, a process significantly amplified in the neurons.
Epiphenomenalism is a position in the philosophy of mind on the mind–body problem.It holds that subjective mental events are completely dependent for their existence on corresponding physical and biochemical events within the human body, but do not themselves influence physical events.
Leibniz's passage describing the explanatory gap is as follows: It must be confessed, moreover, that perception, and that which depends on it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is, by figures and motions, And, supposing that there were a mechanism so constructed as to think, feel and have perception, we might enter it as into a mill.