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The object of consciousness is called the intentional object, and this object is constituted for consciousness in many different ways, through, for instance, perception, memory, signification, and so forth. Throughout these different intentionalities, though they have different structures and different ways of being "about" the object, an ...
So philosophy of mind tends to treat consciousness as if it consisted simply of the contents of consciousness (the phenomenal qualities), while it really is precisely consciousness of contents, the very givenness of whatever is subjectively given. And therefore the problem of consciousness does not pertain so much to some alleged "mysterious ...
Higher-order theories of consciousness postulate that consciousness consists in perceptions or thoughts about first-order mental states. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] In particular, phenomenal consciousness is thought to be a higher-order representation of perceptual or quasi-perceptual contents, such as visual images.
The corresponding entry in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998) reads: Consciousness Philosophers have used the term consciousness for four main topics: knowledge in general, intentionality, introspection (and the knowledge it specifically generates) and phenomenal experience... Something within one's mind is 'introspectively ...
In his more recent work on consciousness, he has made a distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, where phenomenal consciousness consists of subjective experience and feelings and access consciousness consists of that information globally available in the cognitive system for the purposes of reasoning, speech and high-level action control.
Phenomenal Judgements: A theory of consciousness should be able to dispel epiphenominalism [note 7] [16] without resorting to interactionism (a view which Chalmers rejects). [ 17 ] The Double-Aspect Principle : Some information must be realised both physically and phenomenologically (i.e., realised both in the mind and brain).
On the basis of issues relating to vagueness and the emergence of consciousness, Tye endorses a modified, “panpsychist” form of representationalism. This view holds that fundamental physical particles possess a basic, proto-phenomenal mental property that transfers to representational states when the particles are appropriately arranged.
Nida-Rümelin studied philosophy, psychology, mathematics and political science at the University of Munich.. In her doctoral thesis, she discusses the knowledge argument, by the Australian philosopher Frank Jackson, which is directed against a materialist conception of phenomenal consciousness.