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The flexible nature of DO-178C's processes and entry/exit criteria make it difficult to implement the first time, because these aspects are abstract and there is no "base set" of activities from which to work. The intention of DO-178C was not to be prescriptive. There are many possible and acceptable ways for a real project to define these aspects.
Various standards suggest different levels, e.g. Software Levels A-E in DO-178C, [4] SIL (Safety Integrity Level) 1-4 in IEC 61508, [1] ASIL (Automotive Safety Integrity Level) A-D in ISO 26262. [2] The assignment is typically done in the context of an overarching system, where the worst case consequences of software failures are investigated.
Like DO-178C and DO-278A, it is a joint RTCA undertaking with EUROCAE and the document is also published as ED-94C, Supporting Information for ED-12C and ED-109A. [2] The publication does not provide any guidance additional to DO-178C or DO-278A; rather, it only provides clarification for the guidance established in those standards. [ 3 ]
It is a misunderstanding that by purely syntactic rearrangements of decisions (breaking them into several independently evaluated conditions using temporary variables, the values of which are then used in the decision) which do not change the semantics of a program can lower the difficulty of obtaining complete MC/DC coverage. [5]
The flexible nature of DO-178B's processes and entry/exit criteria make it difficult to implement the first time, because these aspects are abstract and there is no "base set" of activities from which to work. The intention of DO-178B was not to be prescriptive. There are many possible and acceptable ways for a real project to define these aspects.
The Advisory Circular AC 20-115( ), Airborne Software Development Assurance Using EUROCAE ED-12( ) and RTCA DO-178( ) (previously Airborne Software Assurance), recognizes [1] the RTCA published standard DO-178 as defining a suitable means for demonstrating compliance for the use of software within aircraft systems.
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These position papers were among the inputs to the joint RTCA/EUROCAE committee that developed DO-178C, DO-278A, DO-248C, and DO-330, and the technology supplements to these publications (DO-331, DO-332, and DO-333). [1] The model for international certification authority harmonization has changed since CAST's inception. [5]