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The authors' approach repudiates the conventional theory of human consciousness as a material epiphenomenon that can be fully explained in terms of physical brain processes and advances the mind as an entity independent of the brain or body. They advance an alternative "transmission" or "filter" theory of the mind-brain relationship.
(2) human psychology. Psychological formalism is defined as the science of mind and corresponds to the behavior of animal objects. Human psychology is considered to be a unique subset of psychological formalism that deals with human behavior at the level of the individual. Because human behavior is immersed in the larger socio-cultural context ...
The "theory of mind" is described as a theory because the behavior of the other person, such as their statements and expressions, is the only thing being directly observed; no one has direct access to the mind of another, and the existence and nature of the mind must be inferred. [11]
Laszlo Garai's writings in theoretical psychology, general psychology and brain research. Theory of Psychology and other Human Sciences (Documents No. 9 and 10 in English) Archived 2016-03-04 at the Wayback Machine Gerhard Medicus (2017). Being Human – Bridging the Gap between the Sciences of Body and Mind, Berlin VWB. Gerhard Medicus (2017).
In the philosophy of mind, emergent (or emergentist) materialism is a theory which asserts that the mind is irreducibly existent in some sense. However, the mind does not exist in the sense of being an ontological simple. Further, the study of mental phenomena is independent of other sciences. The theory primarily maintains that the human mind ...
In the philosophy of mind, panpsychism (/ p æ n ˈ s aɪ k ɪ z əm /) is the view that the mind or a mind-like aspect is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality. [1] It is also described as a theory that "the mind is a fundamental feature of the world which exists throughout the universe". [ 2 ]
Epiphenomenalism is a position in the philosophy of mind on the mind–body problem.It holds that subjective mental events are completely dependent for their existence on corresponding physical and biochemical events within the human body, but do not themselves influence physical events.
Leibniz's passage describing the explanatory gap is as follows: It must be confessed, moreover, that perception, and that which depends on it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is, by figures and motions, And, supposing that there were a mechanism so constructed as to think, feel and have perception, we might enter it as into a mill.