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In the philosophy of mind, multiple realizability is the thesis that the same mental property, state, or event can be implemented by different physical properties, states, or events. Philosophers of mind have used multiple realizability to argue that mental states are not the same as — and cannot be reduced to — physical states.
The quantum-mechanical "Schrödinger's cat" paradox according to the many-worlds interpretation.In this interpretation, every quantum event is a branch point; the cat is both alive and dead, even before the box is opened, but the "alive" and "dead" cats are in different branches of the multiverse, both of which are equally real, but which do not interact with each other.
This is an accepted version of this page This is the latest accepted revision, reviewed on 25 January 2025. Hypothetical group of multiple universes Not to be confused with Metaverse. "Multiverses" redirects here. Not to be confused with MultiVersus. For other uses, see Multiverse (disambiguation). Part of a series on Physical cosmology Big Bang · Universe Age of the universe Chronology of ...
As all physical states (i.e. brain states) are quantum states, their associated mental states should be also. Nonetheless, it is not what one experiences within physical reality. [citation needed] Albert and Loewer argue that the mind must be intrinsically different than the physical reality as described by quantum theory. [6]
Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny, Language and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language, 1987/1999; David Kaplan, "Demonstratives", 1989; Cora Diamond, The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind, 1991; Robert Brandom, Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, 1994
Philosophical realism—usually not treated as a position of its own but as a stance towards other subject matters— is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a ...
The term goes back to Leibniz's theory of possible worlds, [2] used to analyse necessity, possibility, and similar modal notions.In short, the actual world is regarded as merely one among an infinite set of logically possible worlds, some "nearer" to the actual world and some more remote.
The A-series identifies positions in time as past, present, or future, and thus assumes that the "present" has some objective reality, as in both presentism and the growing block universe. [8] The B-series defines a given event as earlier or later than another event, but does not assume an objective present, as in four-dimensionalism.