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Case history; Prior: 183 Ill. 2d 306, 701 N.E.2d 484 (1998): Holding; The police had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop because nervous, evasive behavior, like fleeing a high crime area upon noticing police officers, is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion to justify a stop
Case history; Prior: 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887; cert. granted, 454 U.S. 1140 (1982).: Holding; The rigid "two-pronged test" under Aguilar and Spinelli for determining whether an informant's tip establishes probable cause for issuance of a warrant is abandoned, and the "totality of the circumstances" approach that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations is substituted in ...
Furthermore, the court had already sanctioned an inventory search of an impounded car suspected to contain the service revolver of a fugitive Chicago police officer. [2] The search in this case was conducted according to standard police procedure, and no suggestion existed that the search was a pretext for an investigation.
The area can encompass the entire vehicle, including the trunk. The motor vehicle exception, in addition to allowing officers to search the vehicle, allows officers to search any containers found inside the vehicle that could contain the evidence or contraband for which they are searching (United States v. Ross). The objects searched do not ...
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), was a search and seizure case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States.The high court was asked to decide if a legal warrantless search of an automobile allows closed containers found in the vehicle (specifically, in the trunk) to be searched as well.
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), is a decision by the United States Supreme Court that clarifies what constitutes "waiver" of the right to counsel for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment.
Case history; Prior: 58 Ill. App. 3d 57, 373 N. E. 2d 1013: Holding; When a search warrant specifies the person or people named in the warrant to be searched and the things to be seized, there is no authority to search others not named in the warrant, unless the warrant specifically mentions that the unnamed parties are involved in criminal activity or exigent circumstances are clearly shown.
The Court noted that Congress early observed the need for a search warrant in non-border search situations, [2] and Congress always recognized "a necessary difference" between searches of buildings and vehicles "for contraband goods, where it is not practical to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."