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The general concept or principle of moral universalizability is that moral principles, maxims, norms, facts, predicates, rules, etc., are universally true; that is, if they are true as applied to some particular case (an action, person, etc.) then they are true of all other cases of this sort. Some philosophers, like Immanuel Kant, Richard Hare ...
Moral universalism (also called moral objectivism) is the meta-ethical position that some system of ethics, or a universal ethic, applies universally, that is, for "all similarly situated individuals", [1] regardless of culture, race, sex, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, gender identity, or any other distinguishing feature. [2]
The precise meaning of universalizability is contentious, but the most common interpretation is that the categorical imperative asks whether the maxim of your action could become one that everyone could act upon in similar circumstances. An action is socially acceptable if it can be universalized (i.e., everyone could do it). [citation needed]
Moral universalism (also called moral objectivism or universal morality) is the meta-ethical position that some system of ethics applies universally.That system is inclusive of all individuals, [7] regardless of culture, race, sex, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, or any other distinguishing feature. [8]
Download as PDF; Printable version; In other projects ... Free will; Free, prior and informed consent ... Moral supervenience; Moral universalizability; Moral ...
According to this, moral terms such as 'good', 'ought' and 'right' have two logical or semantic properties: universalizability and prescriptivity. By the former, he meant that moral judgments must identify the situation they describe according to a finite set of universal terms, excluding proper names, but not definite descriptions. By the ...
Universal prescriptivism (often simply called prescriptivism) is the meta-ethical view that claims that, rather than expressing propositions, ethical sentences function similarly to imperatives which are universalizable—whoever makes a moral judgment is committed to the same judgment in any situation where the same relevant facts pertain.
From the PAP definition "a person is morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise", Frankfurt infers that a person is not morally responsible for what they have done if they could not have done otherwise – a point with which he takes issue: our theoretical ability to do otherwise, he says, does not necessarily make it possible for us to do otherwise.