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In microeconomics, the Bertrand–Edgeworth model of price-setting oligopoly looks at what happens when there is a homogeneous product (i.e. consumers want to buy from the cheapest seller) where there is a limit to the output of firms which are willing and able to sell at a particular price. This differs from the Bertrand competition model ...
However, some Cournot strategy profiles are sustained as Nash equilibria but can be eliminated as incredible threats (as described above) by applying the solution concept of subgame perfection. Indeed, it is the very thing that makes a Cournot strategy profile a Nash equilibrium in a Stackelberg game that prevents it from being subgame perfect.
An oligopoly (from Ancient Greek ὀλίγος (olígos) 'few' and πωλέω (pōléō) 'to sell') is a market in which pricing control lies in the hands of a few sellers. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] As a result of their significant market power, firms in oligopolistic markets can influence prices through manipulating the supply function .
Cournot's discussion of oligopoly draws on two theoretical advances made in earlier pages of his book. Both have passed (with some adjustment) into microeconomic theory, particularly within subfield of Industrial Organization where Cournot's assumptions can be relaxed to study various Market Structures and Industries, for example, the ...
This is the case of the basic Bertrand Competition which both firms have the same marginal cost. From the figure, MSS has illustrated that there is only one unique point that both firms are going to set their price. It is the pure strategy of Nash equilibrium. C1 < C2; It means that the marginal cost of Firm 2 is higher than the marginal cost ...
The Edgeworth model shows that the oligopoly price fluctuates between the perfect competition market and the perfect monopoly, and there is no stable equilibrium. [6] Unlike the Bertrand paradox, the situation of both companies charging zero-profit prices is not an equilibrium, since either company can raise its price and generate profits.
Oligopoly. If the two companies can agree on a price, it is in their long-term interest to keep the agreement: the revenue from cutting prices is less than twice the revenue from keeping the agreement and lasts only until the other firm cuts its own prices. [8] Effort to Purchase. If there is a difference in the effort it takes for a consumer ...
"The Kinky Oligopoly Demand and Rigid Prices" The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 55, pp. 432-449. Stigler, G. 1978. "The literature of economics: the case of the kinked oligopoly demand curve" Economic Inquiry Vol. 16, pp. 185–204. Sweezy, P. 1939. "Demand Under Conditions of Oligopoly" The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 47, pp. 568-573.