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Arrow's theorem assumes as background that any non-degenerate social choice rule will satisfy: [15]. Unrestricted domain — the social choice function is a total function over the domain of all possible orderings of outcomes, not just a partial function.
The work culminated in what Arrow called the "General Possibility Theorem," better known thereafter as Arrow's (impossibility) theorem. The theorem states that, absent restrictions on either individual preferences or neutrality of the constitution to feasible alternatives, there exists no social choice rule that satisfies a set of plausible ...
Arrow's impossibility theorem is a key result on social welfare functions, showing an important difference between social and consumer choice: whereas it is possible to construct a rational (non-self-contradictory) decision procedure for consumers based only on ordinal preferences, it is impossible to do the same in the social choice setting ...
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English: This diagram accompanies part one of the proof Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. It illustrates the process of successively moving one candidate from the bottom to the top of ballots. It illustrates the process of successively moving one candidate from the bottom to the top of ballots.
Arrow's impossibility theorem shows that no reasonable (non-random, non-dictatorial) ranked voting system can satisfy IIA. However, Arrow's theorem does not apply to rated voting methods. These can pass IIA under certain assumptions, but fail it if they are not met. Methods that unconditionally pass IIA include sortition and random dictatorship.
Gibbard and Satterthwaite give an impossibility result similar in spirit to Arrow's impossibility theorem. For a very general class of games, only "dictatorial" social choice functions can be implemented. A social choice function f() is dictatorial if one agent always receives his most-favored goods allocation,