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Pages in category "Probability theory paradoxes" The following 21 pages are in this category, out of 21 total. This list may not reflect recent changes. 0–9.
The Bertrand paradox is a problem within the classical interpretation of probability theory. Joseph Bertrand introduced it in his work Calcul des probabilités (1889) [1] as an example to show that the principle of indifference may not produce definite, well-defined results for probabilities if it is applied uncritically when the domain of possibilities is infinite.
Bertrand's box paradox: A paradox of conditional probability closely related to the Boy or Girl paradox. Bertrand's paradox : Different common-sense definitions of randomness give quite different results.
In probability theory, the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox (sometimes known as Borel's paradox) is a paradox relating to conditional probability with respect to an event of probability zero (also known as a null set). It is named after Émile Borel and Andrey Kolmogorov.
In probability theory, the birthday problem asks for the probability that, in a set of n randomly chosen people, at least two will share the same birthday. The birthday paradox is the counterintuitive fact that only 23 people are needed for that probability to exceed 50%.
The paradox starts with three boxes, the contents of which are initially unknown. Bertrand's box paradox is a veridical paradox in elementary probability theory. It was first posed by Joseph Bertrand in his 1889 work Calcul des Probabilités. There are three boxes: a box containing two gold coins, a box containing two silver coins,
Probability theory or probability calculus is the branch of mathematics concerned with probability. Although there are several different probability interpretations , probability theory treats the concept in a rigorous mathematical manner by expressing it through a set of axioms .
However, the overweighting of small probability events introduced in cumulative prospect theory may restore the St. Petersburg paradox. Cumulative prospect theory avoids the St. Petersburg paradox only when the power coefficient of the utility function is lower than the power coefficient of the probability weighting function. [13]