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Disagree and commit is a management principle that individuals are allowed to disagree while a decision is being made, but that once a decision has been made, everybody must commit to implementing the decision. Disagree and commit is a method of avoiding the consensus trap, in which the lack of consensus leads to inaction.
For example, Judge Richard Posner once remarked that falsus in uno was a "discredited doctrine" based on "primitive psychology". This assertion was not made in relation to fraudulent documentation or a "material" inconsistency; rather, it was based on what the court characterizes as "innocent mistakes, trivial inconsistencies, and harmless ...
In the example with the honeymoon options, Rome without free breakfast is the decoy. (It makes Rome with breakfast look superior to Rome without breakfast. Comparing Rome and Paris is difficult, so the easy comparison of Rome makes it more likely to choose Rome over Paris.) It makes Paris look inferior when compared to Rome with the free breakfast.
What’s happening in New York is a twice-baked mistake. And those are the kind that kill organizations, jobs, winning seasons, Super Bowl windows and finally, ownership faith.
In certain situations, the book is given as a gift, for example, when public funds are involved, or when personal events arise, such as congratulating newlyweds. Today in China, the book Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung is mostly seen as a piece of nostalgia.
Double-loop learning is used when it is necessary to change the mental model on which a decision depends. Unlike single loops, this model includes a shift in understanding, from simple and static to broader and more dynamic, such as taking into account the changes in the surroundings and the need for expression changes in mental models. [3]
The gambler's fallacy, also known as the Monte Carlo fallacy or the fallacy of the maturity of chances, is the belief that, if an event (whose occurrences are independent and identically distributed) has occurred less frequently than expected, it is more likely to happen again in the future (or vice versa).
This is a mistake, he argued, both because it is impossible to derive any statement about what one ought to do from statements not concerning obligation (even statements about what is good) and because there is no need to do so since common sense principles of moral obligation are self-evident.