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In criminal law, actus reus (/ ˈ æ k t ə s ˈ r eɪ ə s / ⓘ; pl.: actus rei), Latin for "guilty act", is one of the elements normally required to prove commission of a crime in common law jurisdictions, the other being Latin: mens rea ("guilty mind"). In the United States, it is sometimes called the external element or the objective ...
In criminal law, actus reus (/ ˈ æ k t ə s ˈ r eɪ ə s / ⓘ; pl.: actus rei), Latin for "guilty act", is one of the elements normally required to prove commission of a crime in common law jurisdictions, the other being Latin: mens rea ("guilty mind").
In Western jurisprudence, concurrence (also contemporaneity or simultaneity) is the apparent need to prove the simultaneous occurrence of both actus reus ("guilty action") and mens rea ("guilty mind"), to constitute a crime; except in crimes of strict liability.
In criminal law, strict liability is liability for which mens rea (Law Latin for "guilty mind") does not have to be proven in relation to one or more elements comprising the actus reus ("guilty act") although intention, recklessness or knowledge may be required in relation to other elements of the offense (Preterintentionally [1] [2] /ultraintentional [3] /versari in re illicita).
In criminal law, mens rea (/ ˈ m ɛ n z ˈ r eɪ ə /; Law Latin for "guilty mind" [1]) is the mental state of a defendant who is accused of committing a crime. In common law jurisdictions, most crimes require proof both of mens rea and actus reus ("guilty act") before the defendant can be found guilty.
Whether the actus reus of an attempt has occurred is a question of fact for the jury to decide after having heard the judge's instructions regarding the law. The common law precedent is used to distinguish between acts that were merely preparatory and those sufficiently proximate or connected to the crime.
Such circumstances are completely independent from the actus reus or mens rea elements. In the federal system, for example, a crime may require proof of jurisdictional facts, which are not defined in the statute creating the offense. See generally LaFave & Scott at 273.3.
In Poulterer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 813 (K.B. 1611), the court reasoned that the thrust of the crime was the confederating of two or more, and dropped the requirement that an actual indictment of an innocent take place, whereby precedent was set that conspiracy only need involve an attempted crime, and that the agreement was the act, which ...