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Strategic or tactical voting is voting in consideration of possible ballots cast by other voters in order to maximize one's satisfaction with the election's results. [ 1 ] Gibbard's theorem shows that no voting system has a single "always-best" strategy, i.e. one that always maximizes a voter's satisfaction with the result, regardless of other ...
To a much greater extent than many other electoral methods, plurality electoral systems encourage tactical voting techniques like "compromising". [12] Voters are under pressure to vote for one of the two candidates most likely to win, even if their true preference is neither of them; because a vote for any other candidate is unlikely to lead to ...
Like instant-runoff voting, the exhaustive ballot is intended to improve upon the simpler "first-past-the-post" (plurality) system by reducing the potential for tactical voting by avoiding "wasted" votes. Under the plurality system, which involves only one round, voters are encouraged to vote tactically by voting for only one of the two leading ...
Last time, Starmer was the main winner from tactical voting against an unpopular government in a five-party system. Next time, he may find the voters for all four or four-and-a-half other parties ...
Exclusive: Tories heading for even bigger election wipeout, says shock new poll, as groundswell of anti-Conservative sentiment set to drive party to worst result in more than a century
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Strategic nomination refers to the entry of a candidate into an election with the intention of changing the ranking of other candidates. [1] The name is an echo of ‘tactical voting’ and is intended to imply that it is the candidates rather than the voters who are seeking to manipulate the result in a manner unfaithful to voters’ true preferences.
During the 1950s, Robin Farquharson published influential articles on voting theory. [16] In an article with Michael Dummett, [17] he conjectures that deterministic voting rules with at least three outcomes are never straightforward tactical voting. [18] This conjecture was later proven independently by Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite.