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In game theory, an extensive-form game is a specification of a game allowing (as the name suggests) for the explicit representation of a number of key aspects, like the sequencing of players' possible moves, their choices at every decision point, the (possibly imperfect) information each player has about the other player's moves when they make a decision, and their payoffs for all possible ...
In game theory, a repeated game (or iterated game) is an extensive form game that consists of a number of repetitions of some base game (called a stage game). The stage game is usually one of the well-studied 2-person games. Repeated games capture the idea that a player will have to take into account the impact of their current action on the ...
Constant sum: A game is a constant sum game if the sum of the payoffs to every player are the same for every single set of strategies. In these games, one player gains if and only if another player loses. A constant sum game can be converted into a zero sum game by subtracting a fixed value from all payoffs, leaving their relative order unchanged.
Figure 1: A game tree which depicts each player's possible information set by showing the options at each vertex (A and B for player's 1 and 2 respectively) Information sets are used in extensive form games and are often depicted in game trees. Game trees show the path from the start of a game and the subsequent paths that can be made depending ...
An extensive form game. The extensive form can be used to formalize games with a time sequencing of moves. Extensive form games can be visualized using game trees (as pictured here). Here each vertex (or node) represents a point of choice for a player. The player is specified by a number listed by the vertex.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium in an extensive form game is a combination of strategies and a specification of beliefs such that the following two conditions are satisfied: [15] Bayesian consistency: the beliefs are consistent with the strategies under consideration; Sequential rationality: the players choose optimally given their beliefs.
The first normal-form game is the normal form representation of the whole extensive-form game. Based on the provided information, (UA, X), (DA, Y), and (DB, Y) are all Nash equilibria for the entire game. The second normal-form game is the normal form representation of the subgame starting from Player 1's second node with actions A and B.
An extensive form representation of a signaling game. In game theory, a signaling game is a type of a dynamic Bayesian game. [1] The essence of a signaling game is that one player takes action, the signal, to convey information to another player. Sending the signal is more costly if the information is false.